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I must take you first into the heart of the U.S. government which is where I spenteight years and more. The U.S. government’s bureaucracy is often compared to
that of a university and having worked at a university I can tell you that there are
some comparable elements. On the one hand, there is a tremendous amount of lip
service that is paid to the subject of human rights in the U.S. government and values
and norms of international law find their way into the discourse of leaders fre-
quently. We certainly know that President Bush, when he appeared before the UN
General Assembly last fall [the fall of 2002], spent a great deal of time speaking
about human rights in the context of Iraq. We also know, to be bipartisan about it,
that my boss, President Clinton, spent a great deal of time speaking about the issue
of human rights, particularly in China during the campaign for the presidency in
1992. There are many, many other examples obviously.
On the other hand, we need to know right on the front end that the U.S.
government is not a human rights organization. It is a vast collection of competing
interests that are struggling with each other bureaucratically in every conceivable
way; and human rights is often seen to be a threat by other elements of the
bureaucracy because it limits the freedom of those other competing interests be it
trade with China or indeed U.S. sovereignty in the context of the International
Criminal Court. So there is a constant tug of war inside, not surprisingly.
It’s very important for human rights advocates inside that government to find
ways of demonstrating how values and national interests coincide and indeed they
do in many, many contexts. Certainly, the genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda, which
were the two catastrophic events of the post–Cold War world, created major
instability in both central and southeastern Europe and central Africa, and millions
of refugees, and the crisis became a national security interest to the United States
even though in both cases it wasn’t perceived to be so at the start. Certainly the
issue of democracy and human rights repression in Islamic countries today is a
matter of national interest in the United States in that it clearly blocks political ex-
pression and often can be seen as the cradle of terrorism.
There are plenty of examples of what can happen when we ignore our values in
pursuing what we may at that time think our interests are. Let me give you one
poignant and very credible example, a recently declassified 1990 State Department
cable on Iraq which begins, and I quote: “Human rights and chemical weapons
aside, the interests of the United States and Iraq are generally the same.” Now even
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where international human rights values and national interests can be shown to be
very coincidental and they come together and the bureaucracy is willing to generally
give lip service to it, there are tremendous bureaucratic impediments to actually
moving forward and using the resources of the U.S. government working with other
governments to do such things as intervene in Bosnia or Rwanda to stop genocide.
There are five Washington syndromes that I would just quickly point out to those
of you who are not familiar with the way the federal government works. First is
what I call inter-agency gridlock, which is that consensus on a new policy is
required before it can move forward and if one agency, the Pentagon for example,
wants to block a new policy, the new policy being the insertion of troops in Bosnia,
that’s what will happen.
Then there is the presidential decision-making syndrome and that is because the
only way to break the gridlock of the inter-agency process is to get a presidential
decision but you’re not likely to get such a decision on a tough political issue that
may have costs to the President without some degree of political support, which then
leads you to what I would call the public opinion syndrome and, particularly in
foreign affairs, the public is often not interested until there is presidential leadership.
So the President isn’t going to act without the public behind him.
Then there is what I would call the Vietmalia syndrome which is a combination
of fears that come from Vietnam and the crisis of Somalia, which, of course we all
know went on to be a film, Black Hawk Down, what happened when eighteen U.S.
rangers were killed in a peace-keeping mission in October 1993. It created tremen-
dous fear in the bureaucracy that body bags were going to be accompanying various
human rights adventures in the future. This may not seem to be so applicable under
the presidency of George W. Bush.
Then there is the human rights catastrophe syndrome which is that we need action
before a crisis becomes so severe but that is often not likely because there isn’t
enough attention paid to it until you see the horrors beginning to flash across the
television on CNN.
You can overcome these various bureaucratic gridlocks internally by, frankly,
guerrilla warfare and those of you who are planning to go into the U.S. government
in the foreign affairs area let me make some recommendations to you. Much of the
government works on paper, paper is very important but paper is also very danger-
ous because it has to be cleared. It goes up through the system, that is, various other
elements of the bureaucracy have to look at your paper in order to be able to get it
up to the Secretary of State or higher up and see whether they approve it. If they
don’t approve it, once again the inter-agency gridlock will settle in on you. So what
you need to do is find your own channels and this is happening frequently within
government and I can tell you in the case of Bosnia in 1995 I established a channel
with Richard Holbrook and on directly to the President and that was certainly the
way to accomplish something that had not been accomplished before. In the case of
Haiti in 1994, a channel was established with the Deputy Secretary of State and on
to the President. No paper whatsoever. Phone calls.
It is a cardinal rule in Washington that no subordinates’ phone calls are ever
returned. That is to say, if you want to make a phone call to your superior you’ve
got to make sure you’ve got meetings with him or her because you’re not very often
going to get a phone call returned. But I did find that there was a way to get phone
calls returned when I was trying to move through the bureaucracy and that was to
travel to Sarajevo or Port au Prince or Beijing and then phone back to Washington
with a report of what was happening or what I was doing or what I was seeing, and
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these were authorized trips, of course. Then I would get through right away.
Finally, meetings; the key rule in Washington is that the only important meetings
are the ones to which you are not invited. That being the case, you’ve got to figure
out how to get yourself invited or figure out how to get your bureaucratic opponents
who are on the same level as you disinvited or keep them out of the meeting in some
way.
Now to be serious, beyond these bureaucratic struggles there are other impedi-
ments in the U.S. government and, in fact, going far beyond the government,
embedded frankly in the American position on human rights, and that is the
impediment in particular of what I would call U.S. exceptionalism. That American
exceptionalism is deeply rooted in our history and in our Bill of Rights on human
rights in that we believe, and rightly so, that we have an outstanding system of jus-
tice and rights in our own country and therefore we don’t necessarily have to adopt
the rights systems that are in international law.
This is a position that has been picked up politically and made very serious par-
ticularly on the right side of the political spectrum and I can tell you of many in-
stances running across it when I was involved in the U.S. government. I made a
report to the United Nations on the UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights and
I described in my report some of the efforts that the U.S. was engaged in to try to
bring its own civil rights record to a higher level, particularly since there was a long
history of past abuses. Well there was a big fight inside the State Department and
even more importantly in the Congress over whether that report should be made
because it effectively involved an American government official going to the UN
and saying we are, in fact, equal to other countries and we have plenty of human
rights difficulties that we need to struggle with.
That’s the background. Let me then move to the context today, the struggle for
human rights today. What is it all about. Let’s cut to the chase; it’s clearly about the
crisis of human rights and terror, or more specifically human rights in the context of
the U.S.-led war against terrorism and how that is beginning to play out. The back-
ground that I think we need to know in looking at this is that before September 11
in the whole decade of the post–Cold War reality, the world fundamentally changed
and yet in some ways Americans didn’t realize that. We were self-absorbed. The
Cold War was over, Communism was dead, we had every reason to focus on domes-
tic issues. President Clinton ran on a campaign “It’s the economy, stupid,” at least
the bumper sticker, not what he was saying but what his campaign manager had said.
But there were two great forces that were at work in the world throughout that
decade leading up to September 11. There were the forces of integration and those
were the forces that, in fact, reflected the end of the Cold War, that reflected the fall
of the Berlin Wall and the elimination and the victory over apartheid in South Af-
rica. But they also reflected the triumph of market economics and the technology
boom, the communications revolutions and the fall of various borders leading some
commentators to call this the end of history.
Those were the forces that we hooked up with largely in the decade of the nine-
ties but there were equally powerful forces of disintegration. As the repression of the
Cold War was lifted and states failed, such as Yugoslavia in particular, there was
growing ethnic and religious conflict, there were economic disparities. It became
clear as a result in some ways that the very globalization process reflected the forces
of integration and certainly there was the rise of terrorism leaving some commenta-
tors to refer to this as the clash of civilizations.
Now throughout the nineties U.S. policy was largely focused on promoting the
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forces of integration and surely that was a correct policy but almost as an after-
thought we were also trying to contain the forces of disintegration and nowhere near
enough resources, political and otherwise, were going into that struggle. It was very
hard to build domestic support to address crises in such places far away, Bosnia and
Rwanda; Afghanistan and the Washington syndromes that I referred to earlier often
kicked in to prevent the kind of action that could have been taken.
But there were major warning signals throughout the decade and these warning
signals were showing where the forces of disintegration were going. Five million
civilians killed in internal conflicts in the decade after the Cold War, according to
statistics of the UN: massive regional instability, the Balkans, Central Africa, cer-
tainly the Middle East; Thirty million refugees by the end of the decade; soaring
costs of humanitarian assistance; and terrorist bombing and attacks in 1998 in the
American embassies, and the growth of terrorism leading to September 11.
September 11 was certainly a powerful statement of what those forces were about
and it had two immediate consequences. Americans violently were awakened by
these forces and now no longer saw them as simply operating in faraway places. I
think the second result was that the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism be-
came visible to everyone in places like Afghanistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
the Sudan. These were all human rights disasters where there was religious intoler-
ance, repression of civil society, torture, and other kinds of gross human rights
abuses.
The Bush administration pushed human rights off the agenda largely after Sep-
tember 11. There were really three reasons for this and three manifestations of it.
First the administration characterized again and again the war against terrorism as a
zero sum game, you were either with us or you were against us. There’s a cartoon
that I think speaks more than any analysis can of this, which is that a U.S. official in
Guantanamo is explaining to an Al Qaeda prisoner that international law doesn’t
apply to his case, and the prisoner responds by saying, “Don’t worry, we understand,
we would have done the same thing to you if we had won ourselves.”
The second reason, and real manifestation I think, is that in order to assemble a
coalition to deal with the immediate after-effects of the terrorism and effort to go
into Afghanistan the administration in the United States began to condone human
rights crimes of any country that was with us. In Russia, Chechnya no longer was an
issue of concern. In the central Asian republics we winked at most of the repression
that was going on there, in Pakistan, in China, in Saudi Arabia, in Egypt more than
usual.
Then the third manifestation, I think, was the Bush/Ashbrook war on civil liber-
ties at home as part of the war on terrorism around the world where we had seen, of
course, the round-up of prisoners, often of foreigners based on their national back-
ground, brought under surveillance in great secrecy, treatment of prisoners, and the
like.
The bottom line in my personal view is that the war on terrorism as it is now
being conducted is weakening, not strengthening, international security and under-
mining, not promoting, our national interests. We are losing the support of moder-
ates all over the world who should be our allies. We are strengthening the hand of
authoritarian governments who are cracking down on reformers in the name of
fighting terrorists. We are increasing the likelihood that terrorism will be bred by
repression in places like Egypt and Pakistan, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, and Indonesia.
Above all, I believe we are destroying what Joe Nye has called “our soft power,” our
commitment to human rights, our commitment to democracy and the persuasion of
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people that those are values worth accepting, and replacing it with military force,
our commitment to holding an increasingly hostile world at bay.
Let me conclude by moving to strategies for peace, I believe there is another way.
I believe there are other approaches that could be taken to this overall issue and I
will be the first to say that I have inadequate information to prescribe anything like
a set of policies. I think an orientation of our approach toward policies needs to be
fundamentally different. We need to connect our interests with our values. Surely
there are those within the administration who say that what they are planning with
respect to Iraq is precisely that, but let me come to that in a moment. We need to
recognize that terrorism and the forces of disintegration cannot be stopped without a
strategy for promoting human rights and I think this is a strategy for peace and it
requires a different approach. It draws on the lessons that we have learned in the
human rights wars of the 1990s, most of which we lost, I would say because we
weren’t paying sufficient attention or because we were diverted by the relative calm
in the domestic situation.
There are really seven key points to this strategy. Let me outline them very
quickly. First it needs leadership from the top, not surprisingly, but I think anyone
who has served in government knows that it needs that leadership. The only way to
break out of those gridlocks that I described earlier is to get that kind of leadership
and it may be a pipe-dream but I believe the President should announce that it is an
explicit goal of the United States to work with other countries to promote interna-
tional human rights and standards at home and abroad, a statement of policy that is
clear and filters down to the bureaucracy. There is no question that that’s the only
way to mobilize the bureaucracy in the U.S.; presidential leadership has been shown
again and again to be important in human rights. Unfortunately, there are too many
examples in the wrong direction. Certainly President Bush after September 11 with
the USA Patriot Act is an example, I think, of the wrong kind of signal on human
rights. After the Somalia disaster, President Clinton issued a new policy restricting
U.S. peacekeeping understandably because he felt the political pressures as a result
of the disaster of Somalia, but that in many ways led to our disengagement from
some other disasters, particularly Rwanda.
Second, the strategy must be multilateral. U.S. unilateralism is indeed one of the
main causes of the world’s distrust of our motives and objectives in the war on ter-
rorism. When it comes to human rights a multilateral approach always increases the
legitimacy of the argument and a unilateral approach always raises suspicions that it
is being pursued only for national political reasons.
Third, we need a strategy for preventing or heading off human rights catastrophes
before, not after, they lead to genocide. Here we need to work with other govern-
ments and we have plenty of tools at our disposal. We can jam hate radio, we can
engage in aerial photography of areas that we think are raising serious human rights
problems. We do do that. We can freeze foreign assets of human rights violators, we
can impose sanctions. We can issue arms embargoes, we can withdraw aid, we can
expel ambassadors, we can do many, many things short of actual military interven-
tion.
Fourth, when prevention fails we need to be able and prepared to join with other
countries to intervene, as a last resort, militarily. This is a tricky area, to be sure,
especially after what I’ve said about my concerns on Iraq, and I will get a little bit
into that too. There is now an evolving doctrine of humanitarian intervention. We
will be talking about that later in this conference, I know. It comes out of the inter-
ventions in human rights wars in Haiti, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in East Timor, but we
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need to be very careful about the criteria that are used for intervention in the context
of a human rights crisis of the kind that President Bush has in some ways, correct in
many ways, properly characterised Iraq to be.
There are four criteria that I would set forth. First, genocide and crimes against
humanity should be very much the cause of the intervention; that is, they are being
committed. Second, it should be multilateral. There should be some involvement of
other countries in a significant way, the UN being the forum in which that involve-
ment should occur. Third and fourth are the most important. There should be no risk
of a wider war. There should be regional support. You should be sure that those
countries in the region where intervention is going to occur were not themselves
going to intervene in a way that may cause a wider war. And fourth, there should be
no risk that more lives will be lost than will be saved in the context of such an inter-
vention.
In my view the Iraq intervention doesn’t meet three out of four of the criteria.
It’s not likely to be broadly multilateral and clearly there is a risk of a wider war
because there is very little regional support and it’s certainly very likely that more
lives will be lost than one might say will be saved. We may trigger the very things
that we are trying to stop, the use of weapons of mass destruction and more terror,
certainly in Iraq where there are chemical and biological weapons, in Turkey and
northern Iraq and the tensions with Kurdistan and that regional crisis, the nuclear
weapons existence in Iran and the terrorist attacks that might result in the United
States and Europe. All of these, I think, are especially high if the goal, as we are
now hearing, is to occupy and transform the entire Middle East by military force.
Now fifth, and then let me stop very shortly because this gets into the very spe-
cific topic of the International Criminal Court, there can be no peace without justice.
This needs to be an element of the strategy. There are three basic reasons why it is
essential to hold accountable those who commit massive human rights crimes like
genocide. We need to stop the spiral of revenge that goes on and we saw go on in
the Balkans, for otherwise it will never stop. We need to lift the cloud of collective
guilt so that a whole society isn’t accused of the crimes that the leaders were insti-
gating, and we need to create a deterrent against future crimes because, without the
rule of law, terrorism inevitably becomes acceptable.
I think over the last decade we’ve made great progress in this direction, the estab-
lishment of the two International Criminal Tribunals, the one for Bosnia, and now
the International Criminal Court, controversial as it is. The issues that are keeping
the United States on the sidelines and in some respects very hostile with respect to
the International Court are the issues of this overall conference, they are issues of
sovereignty. They are also issues of international hegemony, which I think is some-
thing that we are very actively pursuing, and indeed reflecting in many respects in
our foreign policy. The fact of the matter is that the administration does not want an
international institution to have any authority to judge the actions of the United
States.
Now, a close reading, and I am sure our panel will give this, of the statute of the
International Criminal Court will show that the primary jurisdiction is in the nation-
state, it’s not in the International Criminal Court, and that if the nation-state is inves-
tigating human rights crimes it will not be brought, nor any of its citizens, before
the International Criminal Court.
The only point I want to make here is that I’m afraid what we see is a wholesale
assault on international law and treaty wherever it seems to impede the freedom of
unilateral action, that is, the large theme that we’re seeing in the justice area. There’s
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a huge cost to this. It costs the U.S. interests, it sends a signal that any other country
can do this, and I think it weakens the fifty-year structure of international treaties
and laws that have been built up that assured some degree of stability and conflict
resolution in the world.
There are two other broad topics that I will just mention and then conclude. We
need to commit ourselves to nation building, peace building, after a war has ended.
We need to be prepared to stay for the long term, not militarily but we need to en-
gage much more with development assistance. We need to be prepared to meet the
humanitarian crises that are going to unfold after that and all too often we have
focused on our exit strategy, speaking of the United States, rather than our long-
term commitment and the fear is that will continue to do that.
Finally, we must work with other countries to find new ways of challenging the
forces of repression that block political expression and turn people often into terror-
ists. That is a very broad topic and it’s not one that I will explore in any depth here.
So let me conclude with a sense that this is a strategy that I think comes out of hu-
man rights background but it does address issues of terrorism. Above all it looks to
address the conditions in which terrorism emerges.
And let me end with a message by an Egyptian democracy activist, Saad Eddin
Ibrahim, who said to the world when he was sentenced last year for challenging the
authorities in his country, and I quote, “Civil society as a space for liberty is an
essential condition for sustained development. Perhaps we are being persecuted to-
day because we have dared to speak openly what millions of others think privately.”
Now I think Egyptian democracy activists like Saad Ibrahim are sending us a mes-
sage of hope and a message related to human rights, but frankly it is also a warning.
It is a warning that if we allow the sacrifice of human rights in the name of fighting
terror, in the long run we will only reap more terror and that, I fear, is exactly what
will happen if we storm into Iraq without broad international support and try to
transform the Islamic world by military force alone.
Ambassador Shattuck touched on two themes relating most directly to the issue       surrounding the International Criminal Court; the importance of human rights
generally and more specifically the importance of democracy in ensuring and foster-
ing human rights. This duo of human rights and democracy arises in quite a prob-
lematic context in relationship to the International Criminal Court, or ICC.  Specifi-
cally, I think that the ICC poses a tension between two different sorts of accountabil-
ity, the legal accountability of perpetrators of grave human rights abuses on the one
hand, and the democratic accountability of the ICC itself, on the other hand.
The other panellists will focus largely on the need for the accountability of perpe-
trators of human rights abuses. I am going to go directly to the second question
concerning the accountability of the ICC itself in terms of its democratic credentials
and legitimacy. In effect, I find a tension embodied within the ICC treaty between
the human rights to freedom from violent abuse, on the one hand, and a human
rights representative government.
The relationship between the ICC and national courts is to be governed by the so-
called complementarity regime embodied in their own treaty. Under the system of
complementarity, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction only if states are unable or un-
willing to do so. As Article 17 of the treaty states, a case shall not be admissible
before the ICC if the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state with
Valerie Epps is professor of law at Suffolk University Law School:
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jurisdiction over it unless that state is unable or unwilling genuinely to prosecute or
investigate. So in this way, complementarity gives priority to states rather than to the
ICC in the development and enforcement of humanitarian law. But the system em-
bodied in the treaty also provides the ICC with the authority to conduct prosecutions
when states are unable or unwilling to do so. If the state where the crime is alleged
to have occurred, the territorial state, is a party to the treaty then the ICC would
have authority to prosecute even if the defendant’s state of nationality were not a
treaty party and had not consented to jurisdiction of the ICC. This is the ICC’s so-
called jurisdiction over non-party nationals.
This jurisdiction over non-party nationals has been central to the controversy
concerning the ICC’s jurisdiction particularly within the United States. I don’t want
to rehearse the whole legal debate about non-party jurisdiction here but I would like
to discuss what I think is the underlying meaning of that controversy. What I think
is ultimately at stake, is the tension that I’ve alluded to between the human rights
embodied in humanitarian law and the human rights of democratic governance. The
ICC may in some circumstances prosecute an individual even without the consent of
that defendant’s state of nationality.
Now the very clear advantage of this ICC power to prosecute is that all too often
the state is the problem. States often collude in genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity and then tend to shield the perpetrators of those crimes. If the ICC
requires the consent of the defendant’s state of nationality before it can prosecute
then the court’s purpose would be largely defeated. An international court is needed
most when the perpetrator acted for or is shielded by a government.  For that reason
the ICC needs and has genuinely super-national powers, powers that are to be used
in those particular cases where a state is unable or unwilling to render accountability.
So where the territorial state consents to ICC jurisdiction, the ICC has the authority
under the treaty to prosecute a defendant without the consent of his state of national-
ity. In essence it’s a super-national solution to the problem of national transgressors.
This kind of super-national authority is a new departure, a new step. Even while
complementarity comports with and supports the authority of the state in a state-
based international system, it also goes beyond state authority and makes an excep-
tion. Where crimes of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity have been
committed or are alleged there is now to be an authority higher than the state and
this is a genuine innovation.
There is a feature of this innovation, however, that’s gone seriously unexamined.
We’ve created a super-national judicial authority but have not really carefully exam-
ined its democratic legitimacy. This stands in stark contrast to our experience with,
for instance, the World Trade Organization where the debate had very much focused
on the so-called democratic deficit of that international organisation. By contrast
with the ICC, we’ve created a powerful new international institution but oddly we
have had virtually no discussion of the democratic features of this new power.
The ICC will wield governmental authority as a judicial body to prosecute or
punish individuals. What is the democratic linkage then between this organ of gov-
ernance and the government? Well for national states that are party to the treaty,
their representation comes through their own state’s consent to become a party to the
treaty and it continues through participation in the Assembly of State parties, the
governing body overseeing the court.
But what then about non-party nationals? What’s the democratic basis for the
ICC’s power as applied to populations whose states have not consented on their be-
half and are not represented in the Assembly of States parties. Here it would be hard
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to claim democratic legitimacy for the ICC. If that’s the case or if that’s even argu-
able it raises the question – why have we heard no clamour about it or even discus-
sion of the democratic credentials of the ICC? I think that we can identify the
reason.
The mandate of the ICC is due to it being very thin and very important. The
implicit unarticulated assumption seems to be that if there is any democratic loss at
all it’s negligible because the court’s mandate is so thin and circumscribed. The
implicit reasoning seems to be that first of all the ICC’s jurisdiction over non-party
nationals is an exception that gives the ICC authority to act only when states fail to
do so and, second,  that exception to state prerogative is thin because, unlike the
WTO, the ICC is not intended to make law and policy, rather the ICC mandate is to
apply clear, uncontroversial standards exist in international law. Genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity are crimes, nobody debates that, and so the
argument goes, there is no democratic or undemocratic decision-making to discuss.
But here the reasoning breaks down. It’s true that the prohibitions of genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity are unquestionable, but applying that law
will inevitably turn out to be far more complex and politically fraught than are the
court’s prohibitions. There will be questions large and small about the content and
interpretation of the law even with the element of crime in place relative to the ICC
statute. For example, relative to the war crime of causing excessive death, injury, or
damage, are countries with the resources to use precision guided munitions obliged
to use those weapons in order to minimize collateral damage rather than using much
less expensive ordinary kinetic weapons? Or relative to that same war crime of caus-
ing excessive death, injury or damage, are belligerents who have not invested in or
cannot afford night vision goggles prohibited from fighting at night because exces-
sive collateral damage could be avoided with the goggles? Or relative to the crime
of genocide, what’s the intent requirement for command responsibility for genocide?
Where the commander knows of the subordinate’s genocidal intent but does not
entertain that intention himself, does he have the necessary mental element for con-
viction for genocide? Relative to the war crime of attacking civilian objects, what is
the status of dual use targeting where the targets are objects like a bridge, television
station, or electrical grid that’s partially in military use and partially in civilian use.
These thin questions are not answered, and they entail enormous political and
even moral issues and controversies. They go to how much needs to be spent for a
given degree of military strength, to basic issues of North/South politics, to issues of
which countries can afford to fight with which allies and coalitions and what would
be the cost of warfare including humanitarian intervention. Each of these questions
involves areas where the law is indeterminate and the politics are complex and don’t
require anything like the mere application of the law to the fact.
So inevitably the ICC will be a feature and an organ of global governance as it
makes and applies international law and policy. As a consequence we can’t avoid the
question of the democratic legitimacy of the ICC by supposing that there’s no
policy-making or law making that will be done there.
It’s also no answer to the problem of democratic governance to say that the solu-
tion is for each state to become a party to the ICC treaty and thereby to again avoid
the Assembly of States parties. Insofar as the states parties will govern the court
through voting in the Assembly of States parties, the Assembly system involves the
form of governance by majority rule and states cannot and should not be forced into
a majority rule system. A system based on the consent of the government requires
that that consent be meaningful, that it be optional, that there will be the option of
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alternatively not consenting. The question of majority rule in any form at the inter-
national level is, as you well know, notoriously complex. The related issues concern-
ing global democracy within or outside the UN system are enormous.
Obviously these questions go well beyond the scope of our session today but what
is clear is that as we move forward in constructing international institutions that will
wield governmental power we ought to be paying very careful attention to demo-
cratic control. I don’t trust governments, I presume that you don’t either. Indeed, if
we did we wouldn’t have any need for human rights safeguards. As we construct
organs of international governance we need to be every bit as attentive to the needs
for checks on power and mechanisms for accountability to the government as we
would be at the national level. In fact, we may need to be more careful because,
while states may provide checks on each other, a global government would have no
such natural checks and balances.
There are two different things that we want here, the human right to freedom
from violent abuse and a way to representative government. Neither can be sacri-
ficed. Quite obviously we can’t countenance the abuse the innocent, nor can we
acquiesce in the erosion of democratic governance. In fact, the two ultimately are
linked; the erosion of democracy leads eventually to violent  abuse.
When I saw that the topic of this particular panel would be the InternationalCriminal Court, I thought there are a number of different things that would
be really interesting to talk about. But I just think it will have to be jurisdiction
because there are differences of opinion about what crimes should come under the
jurisdiction of the court, differences that will surely arise, once the court becomes
operational, about where the national system should deal with a case and where the
ICC should deal with a case. It actually makes me sad that what I felt I had to talk
about (and particularly because it’s most relevant to the overall topic of this sympo-
sium, sovereignty and intervention) is this other area where there is disagreement of
the ICC. Although I’m going to argue that there might not be as much disagreement
as you might think, certainly not from the political perspective of the rest of the
world. That is, if you go to the core of the ICC regime, should this court be able to
indict anybody wherever they’re from or should its jurisdiction over a particular
suspect be dependent on whether that suspect’s state has accepted the jurisdiction of
the court. Again this is not just an academic discussion but something that is con-
tinuing to affect very much this new institution as it’s getting going and to be very
damaging.
There are very different views. There are a few states, and of course the United
States among them, that are of the view that the ICC’s jurisdiction is exorbitant, it’s
an unacceptable challenge to their sovereignty. But I should say that the vast major-
ity of other states do not view the ICC in that way and I would argue that is the
different world view that is a reality now despite what the United States thinks.
So just to put some detail onto that, there are now a total of 140 states that have
either signed or ratified the Rome statute, the treaty. The last one to join was Af-
ghanistan. That’s really quite extraordinary given the fact that this treaty was only
agreed less than four years ago. If you look at any case of treaty ratification in other
contexts it’s extraordinary. I think it’s also significant that even states that haven’t
yet become party to the treaty, many of these states are not opposed in principle to
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this particular aspect of the court and the jurisdictional regime, including Russia and
China. You might be surprised to hear that but even I believe in the last two weeks
there have been serious meetings in Russia in the Duma about the ICC and China has
certainly expressed concerns about the ICC but not the kind of concerns about the
jurisdictional regime that has just been talked about.
During the negotiation of the Rome statute the United States was one of the states
that was pressing very strongly for a jurisdictional regime for the court that was
based on consent. They wanted a kind of locked-in system where a state would have
to not just ratify the treaty but agree to be bound by a list of crimes, a sort of menu
approach, which has actually been adopted. Also, the United States basically wanted
the ICC to be very much an arm of the Security Council, for obvious reasons: it
would be able to have a lot more control. There were other states that wanted the
ICC to have universal jurisdiction, so in other words any individual from any state
in the world could essentially be brought before the court. What resulted was a com-
promise where the court would have jurisdiction automatically where a state ratifies
the treaty. There’s no extra sense of opting in for certain crimes but the court
doesn’t have universal jurisdiction; it only has jurisdiction in either the territorial
state, the state where the crime took place, or the state of nationality of the accused ,
those states that are party to the statute, or very significantly have accepted its juris-
diction on an ad hoc basis for that particular case. In addition, the court will have
jurisdiction over cases referred to it by the Security Council. So this was the middle
way, if you like, that was agreed in Rome.
Sovereignty is number one among the concerns of the United States, and this
does leave some margin for the court to have jurisdiction over a national non-state
party and that is something which the United States has continued to be unhappy
about. Is this such an outrageous idea? Well, if the United States thought so it’s
surprising that the United States has actually, along with other states, of course,
accepted other treaties such as the Geneva Convention and those relating to terrorism
that obliges a state to pursue those suspected of committing relevant crimes regard-
less of whether the suspects are nationals of the states party to the treaty. So it’s not
as if this is a totally unheard of idea. As I’ve mentioned, the reality is that most of
the rest of the world has reached consensus on this point that it is acceptable for the
ICC to have jurisdiction even over individuals who are nationals of a state that has
not accepted the jurisdiction of the court.
I do think it’s also significant that even though there may be room for disagree-
ment on interpretation of some of the specific crimes that are listed in the Rome
statute, broadly speaking even the United States, I should say, accepts the list of
crimes that are set out in the Rome statute as representing crimes that are interna-
tional crimes.
Similarly with the procedure and how the court will operate, the highest due
process standards are incorporated within the procedures in the way in which trials
will be held. We’ve just seen eighteen judges elected who are of extremely high
quality. So I think that we can have a lot of confidence in this court. Obviously it’s
now at a crucial juncture as it sets out and it’s got a long way to go but it has a very
strong base.
I’m not going to detail all the United States’s strong efforts that are going on but
just to say that the United States didn’t stop raising its concerns at the end of the
Rome conference after the ICC treaty was adopted but has continued extraordinary
efforts to try to make sure that no U.S. citizens will ever come before the ICC and
those words have been used by the U.S. Ambassador to the UN. Some of you may
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already be aware, it’s even become something of a joke in Europe — the “American
Serviceman Protection Act,” which is the act aimed at ensuring that the U.S. govern-
ment isn’t going to co-operate with the ICC and may even take measures to rescue
people that might come within its grasp. This Act has been nicknamed the Hague
Invasion Act in Europe and there are actually symbolic plans during the inauguration
of the court to have defenses put up on the beaches in the Netherlands against an
American invasion, just to show up how ridiculous this approach is. The U.S. gov-
ernment is still flying around the world trying to reach these bilateral agreements
with a number of different states to ensure that U.S. nationals can’t be brought to
the court.
These American efforts are not only very much the prevailing view among other
states but are actually extremely damaging to the court and to the whole concept of
the court as it is trying to establish itself now as a universal institution. Of course,
it’s creating enormous resentment and in attending the negotiations of the various
documents that needed to be drafted after the Rome statute on procedure and the
crimes and things, almost every negotiating section would be dominated by concerns
about what the United States government was trying to do. While this very difficult
and serious business of trying to build the court was going forward people would
find themselves having to resist the latest attempts by the United States to undermine
the institution. It really is quite extraordinary the lengths to which the government
has been willing to go.
Another reason why I would say that I’m sad to have to address this particular
question, is that the United States has played an enormously positive role in bringing
about and supporting other international accountability mechanisms. So that’s why
it’s particularly sad to have to address this particular question. Of course, this is not
only a legal but also a moral issue and it makes it very difficult for the United States
to be working enthusiastically for accountability, whether it’s Saddam Hussein or the
Bosnias or Rwandas, when it refuses to even contemplate the possibility that U.S.
nationals might ever be brought before this court. z
